SYN-flooding attack uses the weakness available in TCP's threeway handshake process to keep it from handling legitimate requests. This attack causes the victim host to populate its backlog queue with forged TCP connections. In other words it increases Ploss (probability of loss) and Pa (buffer occupancy percentage of attack requests) and decreases Pr (buffer occupancy percentage of regular requests) in the victim host and results to decreased performance of the host. This paper proposes a self-managing approach, in which the host defends against SYN-flooding attack by dynamically tuning of its own two parameters, that is, m (maximum number of half-open connections) and h (hold time for each half-open connection). In this way, it formulates the defense problem to an optimization problem and then employs the learning automata (LA) algorithm to solve it. The simulation results show that the proposed defense strategy improves performance of the under attack system in terms of Ploss, Pa and Pr.
Introduction
Security has become necessary in a world where more services are relying on internet technology. For this reason, it has attracted a lot of attention in various areas of communication networks [16, 25, and 9] . One of the security breaches is denial-of-service (DoS) attack. A DoS attack can be considered as an attempt of attackers to prevent legal users from gaining a normal network service [27, 30, and 14] . Recent evaluations [15, 18] show that DoS attacks ranks at the fourth place in the list of the most important attack classes for information systems. More than 90% of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks exploit a system's transmission control protocol (TCP) [12] . A well-known DoS attack is SYN-flooding attack. A TCP connection is established in what is known as a 3-way handshake. When a client efforts to start a TCP connection to a server, firstly, the client requests a connection by sending a SYN packet to the server. Then, the server returns a SYN-ACK, to the client. Finally, the client acknowledges the SYN-ACK with an ACK, at which point the connection is established and data transfer commences [11, 6] . In a SYN flooding attack, attackers use this protocol to their benefit. The attacker sends a large number of SYN packets to the server. Each of these packets has to be handled like a connection request by the server, so the server must answer with a SYN-ACK. The attacker does not answer to the SYN-ACK, which will cause the server to have a half-open connection. The result is that the server is left waiting for a reply from a large quantity of connections. There are a limited number of connections a server can handle. Once all of these are in use, waiting for connections that will never come, no new connections can be made whether valid or not. There are some proposed defenses for this attack. Zuquete [3] proposes SYN cookies to defend against SYN-flooding attacks. A SYN-flood detection approach was proposed in [13] . This approach monitors the difference between the number of SYN segments and the number of FIN or RST segments since, under normal TCP behavior, each SYN will correspond to a FIN or RST. Therefore, a sharp rise in difference between the number of SYNs and FINs/RSTs, within a certain time frame, is indicative of a SYN flooding attack. Chang [23] mentioned a simple queuing model for the SYN-flooding attack. Long [19] proposed two queuing models for the DoS attacks in order to obtain the packet delay jitter and the loss probability. Peng [26] compiled an IP address database of previous successful connections. When a network was suffering from traffic congestion, an IP address that did not appear in the database was construed as more suspicious. As another work [6] proposes an autonomous approach in which the victim host defends against SYN-flooding attack by itself and does not involves ISP, router and other network devices. Ling [28] proposed a defense procedure that uses the edge routers that connect end hosts to the Internet to store and detect whether the outgoing SYN, ACK or incoming SYN/ACK segment is valid. This is accomplished by maintaining a mapping table of the outgoing SYN segments and incoming SYN/ACK segments, and creating the destination and source IP address database. In Ming [29] a probabilistic drop scheme is given for implementation in a host server to mitigate SYN-flooding attacks. It proposes an analysis for this scheme, and a general principle for evaluation of the probability of successful connection establishment is presented. We believe that to face the problem of SYN-flooding, there is a need for algorithm which is independent and is aware of the dynamic traffic of the network and changes the defense parameters of the system according to network traffic conditions. The parameters noted in this paper are the maximum number of half-open connections (m) and the hold time (h) of these connections where by the use of learning automata algorithm, the optimized values of these parameters are determined with respect to network conditions. First we will model the system under attack by use of queuing theory, and then we will discuss the learning automata algorithm, and using this algorithm we will offer our methodology, and the way to mapping the learning automata algorithm and will address the issue of SYNflooding attacks.
Learning Automata
Learning automata is an abstract model which randomly selects one action out of its finite set of actions and performs it on a random environment. Environment then evaluates the selected action and responds to the automata with a Reinforcement signal. Based on selected action, and received signal, the automata updates its internal state and selects its next action. Fig. 1 depicts the relationship between an automaton and its environment [20] . Fig. 1 Relationship between learning automata and its environment Environment can be defined by the triple E = {α, β, c} where α = {α , α , . . . , α } represents a finite input set, β = {β , β , . . . , β } represents the output set, and c = {c , c , . . . , c } is a set of penalty probabilities, where each element c of c corresponds to one input of action α . An environment in which β can take only binary values 0 or 1 is referred to as P-model environment. A further generalization of the environment allows finite output sets with more than two elements that take values in the interval [0, 1]. Such an environment is referred to as Qmodel. Finally, when the output of the environment is a continuous random variable which assumes values in the interval [0, 1], it is referred to as an S-model. Learning automata are classified into fixed-structure stochastic, and variable-structure stochastic. In the following, we consider only variable-structure automata. A variable-structure automaton is defined by the quadruple LA = {α, β, p, T} in which α = {α , α , . . . , α } represents the action set of the automata, β = {β , β , . . . , β } represents the input set, p = {p , p , . . . , p }represents the action probability set, and finally P(n + 1) = T[α(n), β(n), p(n)] represents the learning algorithm. This automaton operates as follows. Based on the action probability set, automaton randomly selects an action α and performs it on the environment. After receiving the environment's reinforcement signal, automaton updates its action probability set based on Eq. 1 for favorable responses, and Eq. 2 for unfavorable ones.
Learning automata is a stochastic model operating in the framework of reinforcement learning [24] . Reinforcement learning or learning with a critic is a framework of learning problems in which the teacher or the environment does not indicate the correct action, but provides only a scalar evaluative response to the selection of an action by the learner. Learning automata can be classified under the reinforcement learning schemes in the category of temporal-difference (TD) learning methods. TD learning is a combination of Monte Carlo ideas and dynamic programming ideas. Like Monte Carlo methods, TD methods can learn directly from raw experience without a model of the environment's dynamics. Like dynamic programming, TD methods update estimates based in part on other learned estimates, without waiting for a final outcome [24] . Q-learning [7, 10] , Actor-Critic methods [1] and R-learning [2] are other samples of TD methods. Learning automata differs from other TD methods in the following two ways; 1.The representation of the internal states (a set of action probabilities) and 2. The updating method of the internal states (Eq.1 and Eq.2). Learning automata has found applications in parameter optimization, statistical decision making, telephone routing, pattern recognition, game playing, natural language processing, modelling biological learning systems and object partitioning [4] . Furthermore, learning automata is proved to perform well in the dynamic environments of computer networks. It is used in wireless networks for adaptive rate control [17] , bandwidth control [21] and designing reliable transport layer protocol (Learning-TCP) [5] .
Queuing model
Since queues provide the most intuitive language for explaining traffic and its dependence structure, in the network environment [8] , in this work we use queuing theory to draw a defense map against SYN-flooding attacks. Although a computer system includes several resources, for simplicity, we consider only one resource that is, memory and corresponding backlog buffer. In this model, all connection requests share the same backlog buffer. When a request arrives at the system, the system instantly receives a buffer space of the backlog queue upon finding an inactive buffer space and is blocked otherwise. Now, consider a server under the SYN-flooding attacks.
Assume that in this computer each half-open connection is held for at most a period of time h and at most m concurrent half-open connections are allowed. We assume that a half-open connection for a regular request packet is held for a chance time which is exponentially distributed with parameter µ The arrivals of the regular request packets and the attack packets are both Poisson processes with rates 1 and 2 respectively. The two arrival processes are independent of each other and of the holding times for half-open connections. Obviously, when the system is under attack, then number of pending connections increases and in a point in which there is no more room for pending connection to be saved the arriving packets will be blocked. This leads to increased number of lost connections. On the other hand, when a server is under SYN-flooding attacks, half-open connections can quickly consume all the memory allocated for the pending connections and prevent the victim from further accepting new requests, leading to the well-known buffer overflow problem. In this case, less percentage of buffer space is occupied by legal requests, and major part of this space will be allocated to the attacker requests.
Discussion
As said earlier, as the requests with SYN packets enter the server, the TCP protocol places them in the backup buffer, and allocates necessary resources from the backup buffer for the establishment of a complete connection. 
Therefor the higher the value of this function, the higher the ability of server to provide services. By use of this objective function we warp to use the LA algorithm to increase the functionality of the server that executes this very algorithm. Noting the common factors between the SYN-flooding attack and the learning automata, the LA algorithm is defined following. The server utilizes the initial (h, m) Parameter and initiates providing services and at each round of modelling investigates the objective Function. If the new objective function is bigger than the best objective Function and better than the previous one , then the previous values of (h, m) is used, otherwise the (h, m) value is updated the algorithm continues the execution until it reaches the desired stop Condition. The stages of the proposed algorithm are: Start
1-Initialization of variables. 2-In each round of simulation. 3-1-calculation of objective function.

3-2-comparison with best previous objective function and finding a bigger objective function (use of automata memory) 3-3-Finding of designed (h, m) that result in maximized objective function (use of learned information) 4-continuation of service processes. 5-end
Definition of accidental automata in SYNflooding
The TCP protocol in process of establishing connections uses the two main parameters (h, m) to control the holding-time of half-open connections and also the number of these connections. Therefore the two parameters (h, m) influence the behavior of TCP protocol. In the TCP protocol the values of (h, m) are constant. In this paper the (h, m) parameters via use of learning automata algorithm are changed dynamically, and by moving to an optimal point, cause the early omission of the half open connections, allocated for attack requests. Also the (h, m) parameters make the total number of the system connections a function of the degree of attack and cause operational improvement of TCP in challenging the SYN-flood attacks.
Suitability
One of the main specification of any algorithm is its suitability. Our measures for determining suitability of a proposed algorithm are Ploss, Pr, and Pa. In various steps of execution of an algorithm the closer these measures one to the optimal values, the better the operation of the proposed algorithm. Fig. 2 shows the evaluation process of the LA algorithm: In this problem the victim's memory buffer includes a capacity of m with busy-time of h , h , … , h and there are n requests, with ith request with a value of p and keeps the buffer occupied for a time-interval h , with a remaining buffer capacity of w . The goal is to provide services to a subset of the normal requests, deletion of the attack requests, blocking the attack requests, and have high efficacy of service. A request is either a normal request, or an attack request, the problem is defined as following: minimize ∑ (p . x ) (4) subject to M ∶ ∑ (w . x ) < h , ∀ i ∈ 1 … c x ∈ {0,1} , ∀ i ∈ 1 … n (5) Where xi is the decision variable with respect to waiting ith request. If the ithe request is a normal request, then x is 1, else x is zero. The variables w , p , h cannot assume negative values. In the proposed algorithm the problem is modeled by a complete graph, where every node of the graph is modeled with respect to a request in the defense problem. Each node of the graph is equipped with two operations, choosing of the request to be placed in the buffer, or the deletion of the request from the buffer. Fig. 3 shows the Flowchart of work of proposal method: All these processes are executed repeatedly until an optimal solution is reached, or we reach the condition for maximum required repetition of the algorithm.
Result and Simulation
Here, we study the proposed defense scheme by using two essential security metrics namely, the Probability of Success of Attack and the Buffer Utilization Efficiency. These two metrics represent how severe the SYN-flooding attacks affect the system performance. For this purpose, we follow manner of [30] and give some numerical examples to exhibit how to quantify these security metrics. Let 1=10 as the parameter for the Poisson arrival process of the regular request packets and 2=k1, as the Poisson arrival process of the attack request packets, in which, k represent the ratio between arrival rates of the attack packets and the regular request packets. We use the exponential distribution with the parameter µ=100/s as the service time of regular request packets, and it could represent the strictness of congestions in the network. In order to study proposed approach performance in wide range of attack intensity, we change k from 0 to 2. Total number of connection request is considered 50000 requests, some of them are legal requests and others are attack connection requests. As a reference point we compare our approach with Linux in which m=128 and h=75s statically [22] . . Figure 9 shows that when k increases LA increases m. This makes new capacity for coming legal connections and hence decreases rejection probability of legal connections.
Conclusion
This paper represented a novel approach for defense against SYN-flooding attacks. We used a simple queuing model, to show important metrics of a network under DoS attacks. Then, we mapped the problem of SYN-flooding attack as an optimization problem and then employed LA technique to solve this problem. We tuned holding time and maximum allowable number of half-open connections parameters, dynamically to achieve high performance for the dynamic conditions of the network by LA technique. Simulation results confirmed success of the proposed approach.
Future Works
We offer the following suggestions for developing defense mechanisms to confront the SYN-flooding attacks. One may use the method of seek/search and filtering of the packets and integrate this with some of the working algorithms. By filtering the packets when they enter the server, the system will be more defensive to the attacks. The Genetic Algorithms, Combined Learning Automata Algorithm, the PSO, the Cellular Learning Algorithm, and the SWARM Robotic can be good future works to optimize the defense methods against the DoS and Distributed DoS attacks.
